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Background: In many developing countries, programmes for ‘diseases of social importance’, such as tuberculosis
(TB), have traditionally been organised as vertical services. In most of China, general hospitals are required to
report and refer suspected TB cases to the TB programme for standardised diagnosis and treatment. General
hospitals are the major contacts of health services for the TB patients. Despite the implementation of public
public/private mix, directly observed treatment, short-course, TB reporting and referral still remain a challenge.
Objective: This study aims to identify barriers to the collaboration between the TB programme and general
hospitals in China.
Design: This is a qualitative study conducted in two purposefully selected counties in China: one in Zhejiang,
a more affluent eastern province, and another in Guangxi, a poorer southwest province. Sixteen in-depth
interviews were conducted and triangulated with document review and field notes. An open systems perspec-
tive, which views organisations as social systems, was adopted.
Results: The most perceived problem appeared to be untimely reporting and referral associated with non-
standardised prescriptions and hospitalisation by the general hospitals. These problems could be due to the
financial incentives of the general hospitals, poor supervision from the TB programme to general hospitals,
and lack of technical support from the TB programme to the general hospitals. However, contextual factors,
such as different funding natures of different organisations, the prevalent medical and relationship cultures,
and limited TB funding, could constrain the processes of collaboration between the TB programme and the
general hospitals.
Conclusions: The challenges in the TB programme and general hospital collaboration are rooted in the
context. Improving collaboration should reduce the potential mistrust of the two organisations by aligning
their interests, improving training, and improving supervision of TB control in the hospitals. In particular,
effective regulatory mechanisms are crucial to alleviate the negative impact of the contextual factors and
ensure smooth collaboration.
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T
uberculosis (TB) is a global public health problem
with 8.7 million TB patients and 1.4 million deaths
in 2011. More than 95% of TB deaths occur in
low- and middle-income countries (1). Global TB control
adopts a systematic public health approach called directly
observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) as recom-
mended by the World Health Organization (WHO) since
the 1990s. DOTS is largely implemented by public sector
services under national TB programmes (NTPs). How-
ever, many patients seek care from a variety of health
services that are not formally included within the DOTS
framework (2). Hospitals remain a challenge for providing
TB services. A survey in seven larger African and Asian
countries showed that TB treatment in hospitals was often
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associated with non-referral or non-reporting to NTPs,
poor adherence to the standard NTP regimen, lack of
patient-tracing mechanisms, or unknown treatment out-
comes (3). As a component of the health system, TB
control has to engage all providers in the health system
to achieve the targets of case detection and treatment
success. This takes many forms in different countries:
publicprivate mix, privateprivate mix, and public
public mix (PPM-DOTS) (4). In China, this includes the
cooperation between the public hospitals and the TB
programme (publicpublic mix) and the involvement of
village doctors (publicprivate) in TB control.
China has the second largest TB burden in the world,
with one million new TB cases each year (1). China’s TB
control is led by the health bureau, relying on four levels
of TB programmes: national, provincial, prefectural, and
county. The TB programme is normally hosted within
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) at all
levels. The TB programme at the county level is the
endpoint of TB control. At the county level, the TB
programme collaborates with a three-tier general health
services network combining county hospitals, township
hospitals, and village clinics (5). The health bureau, as
the government authority, oversees such collaboration.
Currently, the most popular form of PPM-DOTS is called
‘TB programme-based model’. In most of China, the TB
programme has its own TB clinic, which provides stan-
dardised diagnosis and treatment for general TB cases,
either self-reported to the TB clinic or referred from
general health services, including general hospitals. The
TB programme also supervises reporting and referrals of
TB suspects and cases and traces all the referred cases who
do not visit the TB programme within 3 days. The general
hospital has a limited role in treating TB, except for treat-
ing complicated and severe TB cases. General TB cases
treated in the TB programme enjoy free care, and costs of
essential anti-TB drugs, X-rays, and sputum checks are
covered by the TB programme.
Before 2003, TB control in China was inadequate with
the case-detection rate stagnating at around 30% (6).
TB was supposed to be diagnosed and treated in the
TB programme. However, the national survey showed
that 91% of the symptomatic TB patients who visited
health facilities used general health services as their first
contact, including 34% for the general hospitals. Only
13% of the patients diagnosed by the general hospitals
were referred to the TB program (7). Public hospitals
who treated TB patients rarely used DOTS regimens and
nor did they report TB to the TB programme or provide
free diagnosis and drugs to TB patients. Moreover, public
hospitals often over-prescribed drugs and examinations
for profit (8, 9). Many studies have reported the long shop-
ping cost and diagnosis delays of TB patients seeking care
among public hospitals before their diagnosis at the TB
programme (1012).
In 2005, China achieved the WHO targets for TB
control with 80% of new smear-positive TB case detec-
tion (6), largely thanks to the post-SARS public health
systems strengthening. Since 2003, the national govern-
ment has increased funding for public health institutions,
revised law on the control of infectious diseases, and esta-
blished the world’s largest internet-based communicable-
disease reporting system (6). In 2004 and 2005, the Ministry
of Health issued two notices: ‘Notice about Further
Strengthening of TB Report and Patient Management’
and ‘Operational Methods to Refer and Trace TB Cases’,
respectively. The standard of TB reporting, referring, and
notification from general hospitals was further developed,
and the mechanism of collaboration between general
hospital and TB programme was re-established. Strength-
ening the collaboration between public hospitals and the
TB programme also received support from international
agencies such as the Global Fund.
Thanks to PPM-DOTS and post-SARS public health
strengthening, reporting and referral rates have greatly
improved in recent years (1315). General hospitals re-
main one of the most important contacts for TB patients.
However, one study showed that more than 20% of TB
suspects and patients needing referral from hospitals did
not reach TB programmes (13). Our studies found that half
of the general TB patients (without comorbidities) chose
general hospitals as their first contact with health care
(16, 17). Before being referred to the TB programme, 80%
of these patients visited the general hospitals and nearly
half of them were hospitalised in the general hospitals,
largely contributing to the catastrophic health expendi-
tures of the TB patients (16, 17).
In recent years, a new form of PPM-DOTS, known as
‘designated hospital-based model’, has emerged in some
provinces of China, where a ‘designated’ hospital pro-
vides the standard TB diagnosis and treatment, while
the TB programme remains the basic management unit.
However, this model of collaboration did not necessarily
reduce patients’ out-of-pocket payments (16, 18, 19). Our
qualitative study also suggested that the recent reform
has met with great health system challenges, especially in
western areas (5). By the end of 2012, less than 30% of
the counties had established the ‘designated hospital-
based model’ (20). Currently, the TB programme-based
model remains the most common model of PPM-DOTS.
Very few qualitative studies have specifically focused on
the collaboration between the TB programme and gen-
eral hospitals in this model. Also, none have adopted a
systems perspective that helps to understand the config-
uration of factors related to context, process, and output
of such collaboration. Using an open systems perspective,
this study aims to identify the barriers to collabora-
tion between the TB programme and general hospitals
in China.
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Methods
Conceptual framework
Inter-organisational collaboration can be viewed as an
open system, which is defined as a coalition of shifting
interest groups, strongly influenced by environmental fac-
tors, who develop goals by negotiating structure, activi-
ties, and outcomes (21). Open systems theory argues that
organisations are social systems made up of a structur-
ing of events or processes, attitudes, beliefs, and motiva-
tions of humans. The theory stresses the complexity and
variability of parts, the looseness of connections, amor-
phous system boundaries, and attention to process, not
structure (21).
Health services and organisations, such as the TB
programme and general hospitals, are highly specialised
and fragmented. They are often characterised by differing
rules, boundaries, funding streams, and institutional and
professional cultures. Inter-organisational collaboration
allows organisations to constructively explore their differ-
ences and address barriers beyond their own limited
visions of what is possible. They do this by transforming
organisational inputs, such as financial, regulatory, and
technical resources, as facilitated or constrained by the
context (22). The processes of inter-organisational collabo-
ration could involve addressing three major sub-systems:
1) the maintenance sub-system, which aligns different
interests and values to hold the social structure together by
reducing variability; 2) the management sub-system, which
improves collaboration efficiency through control, coordi-
nation, directing, regulatory mechanisms, and authority
structure; and 3) the technical sub-system, which provides
technical support to achieve the essential goals of the
collaboration (2326). An open systems framework is
adapted to help to understand the collaboration of the
TB programme and general hospitals (Fig. 1).
Study design
This study is part of a larger project that explored the dif-
ferent models of the TB programme and general hospital
collaboration in China (5, 16, 18, 19). A qualitative study
design was adopted, which was particularly valuable
when seeking to explore implementation processes in
depth (27). This study was conducted in two counties:
one in an eastern province in China and the other in a
south-western province. It is always of interest to under-
stand policy implementation issues across eastern and
western China. ‘East’ and ‘west’ are two geographical
areas with political significance in China. Eastern areas
are normally better off whereas the western areas tend to
be poorer. The prevalence of TB in western areas is twice
as high as that of eastern areas (28). Zhejiang is a more
affluent province on the eastern coast, and Guangxi
(located in the southwest of China, bordering Laos and
Vietnam) is poorer. ‘ZD’ is the relatively rich county site
from the eastern province, and ‘GP’ is the relatively poor
county site from the western province. (The research sites
are abbreviated to protect the anonymity of the respon-
dents.) ZD has significantly higher TB notification rates
than GP. Both sites reported having achieved more than
an 85% cure rate for new smear-positive cases and a
70% case-detection rate. Both sites have similar TB
service delivery systems. The models of TB programme and
hospital collaboration are identical  a ‘TB programme-
based model’ in both sites, whereby the general hospitals
refer TB suspects and general TB patients to the TB
programme for standard diagnosis and treatment.
Data collection
Sixteen in-depth interviews were conducted in the two
sites using semi-structured interview topic guides. The
methods and procedures of the in-depth interviews were
similar to those used in our published study (5). Purpose-
ful sampling was used, in order to select information-rich
cases for in-depth study (29). The potential interviewees
were identified based on their relevance to the questions,
resulting in eight interviews being conducted in each
site (Table 1). In each site, interviewees included leaders
and staff from the county health bureau, county general
hospital, and county CDC (which hosted the TB pro-
gramme). The health bureau director was selected because
that position led the TB control work, provided funding,
and managed the TB control work. The TB programme
director and staff were at the core of policy implementa-
tion as they treated TB and managed and supervised
the hospital reporting and referral. The hospital director
played a leading role in policy implementation within the
hospital. Doctors working in the outpatient (e.g. respira-
tory), radiological, and laboratory departments remained
crucial in reporting and referring TB suspects and cases.
Interviewing inpatient doctors helped to understand their
admission behaviour. Public health doctors were key to
Context
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Fig. 1. An open systems framework to study TB programme
and general hospital collaboration.
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policy implementation as they monitored and supervised
reporting and referrals and served as the focal point
for the coordination between the hospital and TB
programme. This composition of interviewees reflected
the ‘maximum variability principle’, providing rich in-
formation from different experiences and perspectives.
A general interview guide approach was adopted, allow-
ing the basic topics to be covered and adapted in each
interview (30). Topics were loosely structured around key
issues related to general hospital and TB programme
collaboration, such as governance, funding, communi-
cations, and linkages between the TB programme and
general hospitals.
The research team included TB researchers from the
University of Leeds based in China and Shandong
University. The researchers were experienced in conduct-
ing qualitative research in TB and health systems. Their
identity as university researchers, instead of health offi-
cials, enabled the interviewees to comment on sensitive
issues more openly. The county TB programme was respon-
sible for the coordination of the project and communi-
cated with the relevant departments falling into the
interview categories. Health workers, available for 1-h
talks, were invited for interviews. They were reassured of
the research nature and their anonymity, were provided
with the research outline, and were asked to sign an
informed-consent form before the interview. All interviews
were audiotaped and lasted between 40 and 100 min
(60 min average). The recording was transcribed by
trained postgraduate students from Shandong University
and checked by the primary interviewer. Ambiguous or
inaudible sections of text were clarified by interviewees via
emails or phone calls.
To triangulate the in-depth interview data, we reviewed
published and unpublished documents regarding PPM
leadership, health financing, financial reports, routine
TB reports, and other relevant ‘grey’ literature. During
our field work, we also observed TB control activities,
and notes were taken. Ethical approval was granted by
the Ethical Committee of the School of Public Health of
Shandong University.
Data analysis
Analyses focused specifically on identifying content re-
lated to the context, process, and output of TB programme
and hospital collaboration. The methods and procedures
of qualitative analysis were similar to another published
study (5). Specifically, a thematic approach was used (27)
to allow for the application of the existing framework
(open systems framework) and the inclusion of emerging
themes from the data. Analysis was supported by Weft
QDA, a computer-assisted qualitative analysis programme.
A framework table was progressively established and
structured following the reading through of the topic
guides and transcripts. Transcripts of each interview were
coded into the related themes and sub-themes. The themes
and sub-themes were modified, and emerging themes were
included following the coding process (Table 2). A team
approach was used, which provided a form of researchers’
triangulation (31, 32). In addition, triangulation was
performed to refute or confirm emerging findings within
each data set across different sources of data. For example,
as financial interests began to emerge as a key issue within
the interview data, this was also explored within docu-
ments and field notes. Triangulation provided a validation
process, thereby increasing the construct validity and
trustworthiness of our findings. Bearing in mind the
potential for ‘leading’ questions, the team also reviewed
the questions and participants’ responses, which generally
provided balanced and open accounts.
Results
Our study identified barriers to a closer collabora-
tion between TB programmes and general hospitals in a
semi-vertical TB control system. These mainly centred on
contextual influences on the interests of general hospitals
and TB programmes; management of hospital and TB
Table 1. Sampling for the in-depth interviews
Organisation Positions ZD GP
Health bureau Vice director 1 1
CDC (TB programme) TB programme director 1 1
TB programme staff 1 1
General hospital Director 1 1
Outpatient doctor 1 1
Inpatient doctor 1 1
Radiology staff 1 1
Public health staff 1 1
Total 8 8
Table 2. Example of coding list
Conceptual
dimensions codes
Output Adherence to TB guidelines
Drug prescriptions
Hospitalisation
Process Mistrust between TB programme and hospital
Social benefits
Financial interests
Supervision
Technical support
Context Funding for hospital versus CDC/TB programme
TB control system structure
Hospital versus CDC resources
Medical culture
Relationship culture
Funding on TB control
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programme collaboration; and technical support from
TB programmes to general hospitals; and the perceived
output of collaboration, that is, untimely referral, asso-
ciated with perceived poor adherence to TB guidelines.
The two sites presented more similarities than differences.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of contextual factors
that influence the TB programme and general hospital
collaboration.
Contextual influence on the interests of general
hospitals and TB programmes
Salaries and operational costs of TB programmes were
mainly funded by the government. However, government
investment only accounted for a small amount of fiscal
income in the public hospitals. More than 85% of revenue
of general hospitals came from selling medications and
medical services. It was suggested that differences in the
funding system may have influenced the different inter-
ests of TB control between these two types of health
facilities. It appeared that the TB programme wanted all
patients to be treated under the DOTS programme for
social benefits, whereas general hospitals tended to retain
TB patients for financial interests.
There are conflicts in the interests of TB control be-
tween the TB programme and hospital staff anyway.
The TB programme has a work target and hopes to
detect more patients. But the general hospital wants
to make more money. (GP health bureau staff)
The TB programme staff accused general hospitals of
only treating TB patients for profits. In general hospitals,
a performance-based payment system was implemented
that incentivised doctors based on the services they pro-
vided and the examinations and drugs they prescribed.
As a result, hospitals tend to retain TB patients for
profits because referring patients may affect their income.
However, the hospital staff disagreed with the criticism
from the health bureau and TB programme that they
always admitted patients for profit reasons. They main-
tained they referred TB patients to the TB programme
and admitted patients based on their conditions.
Very often we refer the TB suspects and patients once
we detect. As we have limited hospital beds, we try to
avoid admitting patients. (ZD hospital staff)
Once we detect TB patients, we would explain to
them how TB could be treated and what condi-
tions we have here. We told them it was free and
professional in the TB programme and recom-
mended them being examined and treated there. We
did recommend the serious patients to be hospita-
lised here. For example, we would admit those
elderly people with breathing difficulty directly.
(GP hospital staff)
Contextual influence on the management
of hospital and TB programme collaboration
A leadership committee was established at the county level
to solve strategic issues of TB control. It included the
Differences in the funding
system:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Interests:
Untimely referral, associated with perceived poor adherence to TB guidelines:
TB programme: social
benefits
General hospitals:
financial interests
Unstandardized hospitalisation
Unstandardized prescriptions
Management:
Technical:
Lack of technical support
from TB programme to
general hospital
TB programme difficult to
supervise general hospitals
CONTEXT:
PROCESS:
OUTPUT:
Structure: CDC stands side
by side with the general
hospitals
Medical culture: General
hospital has stonger voices
and more resources than
CDC
Working culture: Personal
relationships count
Limited funding on TB
control
Public hospitals: llimited
government investment,
performance-based
payment system;
CDC/TB Programme:
government funded
Fig. 2. Dynamics of TB programme and general hospital collaboration.
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vice governor and directors of the health bureau and Finance
Bureau. Another committee was established at the health
bureau level that included the director of the health bureau
and directors of general hospitals, the TB programme, and
township hospitals. The role of this committee was to solve
operational issues such as TB treatment and referrals.
However, responsibility for the daily management of TB
control remained with TB programmes. TB programmes
are responsible for supervising TB tasks in the general
hospitals and reporting the results to the health bureau for
hospital evaluation. However, TB programme staff often
felt helpless in supervising the TB control work by the
general hospitals. They reflected that it was difficult to
coordinate their relationship with the general hospital or
monitor the clinical behaviour of the hospital staff. They
even attributed this challenge to the ‘mutual choices’ of
both doctors and patients.
If the patients need to be hospitalised, the hospital
should report to the TB programme, but they may
not do so. We do not have special measures to
control the hospitalisation rate of the TB patients in
the general hospital. This totally depends on the
willingness of the general hospitals and the patients
themselves. Patients themselves wouldn’t agree to
be hospitalised without money. We have no choice.
(GP TB programme staff)
The CDC stands side by side with the general hospitals;
both are under the leadership of the health bureau. This
structure has weakened the TB programme’s supervision
of the TB control work by the general hospitals. The
general hospital seemed to have stronger voices in the
health sector as it had more resources generated from
health insurances and patients than the CDC which only
had a limited number of TB patients. Hospitals are very
influential and closer to people’s everyday life and so are
more well-known than the public health facilities. Some-
times, the director of a general hospital is also the vice
director of the health bureau, indicating the importance of
medical work in the hospital.
Just like you and me, we can’t give orders to each
other. The TB programme doesn’t have authority
over the hospital. The TB programme is helpless if
the hospital director does not follow its advice. The
director of [the] general hospital is the vice director
of health bureau. If the hospital does not refer TB
patients, the TB programme has no way of persuad-
ing him . . .. (GP health bureau)
They [general hospitals] are the ‘big brother’ in the
health sector, so how can we manage and supervise
them? (ZD TB programme staff)
The health bureau should have played an important
role in coordinating the relationships between the TB
programme and the hospitals. However, this was not
necessarily the case. Instead, the personal relationships
were regarded as more effective in daily coordination than
the regulations or punishments from the health bureau.
A small referral incentive was provided to the hospital
doctors, whereas those who did not refer or report would
face a fine. However, the punishment was rarely practised.
For example, general hospitals that were found not refer-
ring TB suspects were only informally ‘criticised’ by the
health bureau and not necessarily ‘punished’.
Leaders of the health bureau are aware of this, but
they could do little about it. Even they are helpless
in managing an effective relationship between us
[hospital and TB programme]. (ZD TB programme
staff)
Certainly, we can punish the hospital, but we can’t
do that for the political reasons . . .. The personal
relationships between the two organisations [hospi-
tal and TB programme] are so important. Just one
call can solve problems, if both have a good rela-
tionship. (GP health bureau staff)
Contextual influence on the technical support
from the TB programme to general hospital
The TB programme and general hospitals normally met
on a monthly basis for meetings or supervisions. The TB
programme had the responsibility of training the public
health doctors from general hospitals, township hospi-
tals, and village clinics once a year on TB control. The
public health work appeared to be less important within
the hospital compared with the clinical work because it
did not bring major income but, rather, consumed the
hospital’s budget. Technical support was relatively weak
from the TB programme to the general hospitals for TB
control. The doctors from internal or respiratory medi-
cine at the general hospitals reported that they had not
received any training from the TB programme or other
institutions in recent years. However, they did report
training, albeit limited, provided by the public health
doctors within the hospital, although the quality of this
training was a concern.
I don’t know if there is any training course. I have
never participated for these two years. I just remem-
ber the public health doctors within our hospital
explained the ‘referral’ notes to us. It was in a mess
. . .. We always forgot which sheet should be given to
patients and which sheet [should] be sent back to the
public health department. (GP hospital staff)
I have not participated in any training related to TB
control in the recent two years. Normally, only one
staff can participate in the training each time as we
are very busy with our work. (ZD hospital staff)
Lack of training could be associated with limited fund-
ing on TB control, which was normally sourced from
the local government, the central transfer budget, and
Guanyang Zou et al.
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external project funding. In general, the study at both sites
revealed that the TB control budget was not sufficiently in
line with the current TB epidemic and workload. Without
enough funding in place, it would be difficult for the TB
programme to provide effective support to the general
hospitals. Together with lack of supervision and income-
generating activities of the hospital, this would compro-
mise the quality of reporting and referral.
The operational cost keeps increasing by year, but
the financial input from the government is beyond
our control. The budget is fixed and cannot be
changed, but we do feel it is not enough. (ZD TB
programme staff)
Untimely referral, associated with perceived
poor adherence to TB guidelines
As a result, untimely referral was identified as the biggest
barrier for the hospitals and TB programme collabora-
tion. Associated with this problem was the perceivably
poor adherence to TB guidelines as reflected by non-
standardised prescriptions and hospitalisations.
There was a concern that too many non-standardised
hospitalisations occurred in the general hospitals. Ac-
cording to the TB guidelines, TB should be reported
to the TB programme once they were diagnosed in the
hospital. However, reporting and referring TB patients
were often made after the patient had been discharged.
The general hospital would recommend TB patients
to be hospitalised first and over half of them were
hospitalised. (ZD TB programme staff)
The tendency for over-hospitalisation was concerning
due to the potential consequence of increasing the
financial burden of TB patients.
Patients are squeezed until the last pence of their
money before being referred to us. The patient ex-
penditure in the hospital is very high as the hospital
implements the performance-based salary, which
is related to the volumes of prescribed drugs and
examinations. (ZD TB programme staff)
On the other hand, associated with the TB treatment in
the hospital was the non-standardised prescription of TB
drugs, which had the potential to cause the development
of multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB.
Prescriptions in the hospital are not always standar-
dised. For example, they do not use the quadruple
drug (as prescribed by the WHO and NTP); rather,
the three-combined drugs without rifampin . . ..
There were also irrational prescriptions of levoflox-
acin . . .. One patient was hospitalised for more than
10 days; given intravenous drips of streptomycin.
(ZD TB programme staff)
Discussion
Using an open systems framework, our study identified
barriers to collaboration between the TB programmes
and the general hospitals. The most perceived problem
appeared to be untimely reporting and referral associated
with non-standardised prescriptions and hospitalisation
by the general hospitals. These problems could be due to
financial incentives of the general hospitals, poor super-
vision from TB programmes to general hospitals, and
lack of technical support from TB programmes to general
hospitals. However, contextual factors, such as different
funding natures of different organisations, prevalent medi-
cal and relationship cultures, and limited TB funding,
could constrain the processes of collaboration between
TB programmes and general hospitals.
Unlike another study that evaluated the integration of
clinical TB services in the general hospitals (5), we found
more similarities than differences across the richer east
and poorer west sites. However, the fact that few thematic
differences were observed between two qualitatively differ-
ent sites does not mean that our results could be applied
across the entire health care system in China. The study
approach has a limitation in generalisability. However,
it provides an in-depth platform from which to apply the
open systems theory, which helps in understanding the
configuration of context, process, and output of hospital
and TB programme collaboration in the context of PPM-
DOTS. Although representativeness and sample size are
not the major concern in qualitative research (33, 34),
future research could be built on these findings with a
larger sample size and a mixed design to understand the
effect of this collaboration.
In general, this study supported the quantitative find-
ing of our previously published study that nearly half of
the uncomplicated TB patients who visited the general
hospitals received hospitalisation before referral (16, 17).
The average hospitalisation was nearly 20 days, causing
a significant financial burden on the TB patients and
delayed opportunity to receive the standardised treat-
ment in the DOTS facilities (16, 17). Using an open
systems perspective, we disclose the ‘black box’ of hospital
and TB programme collaboration in association with the
perceivably poor collaborative outputs. The open systems
framework views hospital and TB programme collabora-
tion as a social entity and helps to address the speciality,
fragmentation, and complexity of the interest groups. The
collaboration may be influenced by contextual factors,
which shape their interests, management, and technical
cooperation (processes).
The general health services have long separated from
the vertically orientated services such as the TB pro-
gramme. However, different funding mechanisms between
the general hospitals and TB programmes may have
shaped different interests. The post-SARS public health
strengthening efforts may have largely reduced the financial
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interests of the public health institutions such as the CDC
(6). However, this change did not improve the partially
or self-funded status of the hospitals (5). The public
hospitals were encouraged to raise income by charging
patients and operating like a private entity, due to the
limited government funding (35). The TB programme,
fully funded by the government, has a strong commitment
to TB control as it pursues ‘social benefits’, whereas
general hospitals may compromise this with ‘profit-orien-
tated’ service. These contrasting interests may lead to
mistrust between these two organisations, thus damaging
collaboration (5, 36). The disagreement over the ‘profit-
orientated’ hospitalisation, as reflected in this study,
might reflect the different understanding of the hospita-
lisation criteria and lack of communication between the
two organisations. The performance-based incentives for
health providers, such as reporting and referral incentives,
have played an important part in improving referrals (37).
However, the minimal financial incentives, either posi-
tive or negative, may not be effective enough for the TB
referral system. Appropriate financing mechanisms should
be developed to motivate the general hospitals to conduct
and support public health work; for example, by encoura-
ging referrals in this case (12).
Contextual factors also shaped the authority and
power relationship of collaboration. The parallel position
between the CDC (which hosts the TB programme) could
reduce the authority of the TB programme to supervise
the work of general hospitals. However, the superior
status of general hospitals to public health facilities, due
to the prevalent medical culture and better resources,
could worsen the situation. Another study suggested the
importance of a powerful intermediary source, such as
the health bureau, in mediating the difficult relationship
between the TB programme and general hospitals (5).
However, this study suggests that the health bureau is
embarrassing in hospital management as income genera-
tion is important for hospital development. Relationship
culture is popular, which may often replace the rigorous
implementation of regulations as an alternative (5, 36, 38).
In this case, effective inter-organisational collaboration
may require more informal contacts and communications
between the organisations (22). However, strong regula-
tory frameworks with effective implementation are indis-
pensable for effective collaboration. The health bureau
should make good use of the PPM-DOTS committee as
an important governance platform and play a positive
role in monitoring and evaluating the clinical behaviour
of the hospitals based on the TB and other PPM-DOTS
guidelines.
Consistent with another study (12), we found a general
lack of training for general hospital staff on DOTS
expansion from the TB programme. Lack of funding
for TB control could have a direct impact on the delivery
of training. This could result in poor reporting and
referral and poor management of TB cases, as was often
observed in the non-DOTS hospitals, potentially gener-
ating a high prevalence of MDR TB (3). Although the
financial interests of the general hospitals and ineffective
supervision from the TB programme need addressing, it
is important to improve the training of general hospital
staff on the identification, reporting, and timely referral
of potential TB cases to the DOTS facilities.
Conclusions
The challenges in the TB programme and general hos-
pital collaboration are rooted in the context. Improving
their collaboration should reduce the potential mistrust
of the two organisations by aligning their interests and
improving training and supervision of TB control in the
hospitals. In particular, effective regulatory mechanisms
are crucial to alleviate the negative impact of the con-
textual factors and ensure smooth collaboration.
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